Modal realism
Philosophical concept
Philosophical concept
Modal realism is the view propounded by the philosopher David Lewis that all possible worlds are real in the same way as is the actual world: they are "of a kind with this world of ours." It states that possible worlds exist, possible worlds are not different in kind from the actual world, possible worlds are irreducible entities, and the term actual in actual world is indexical, i.e. any subject can declare their world to be the actual one, much as they label the place they are "here" and the time they are "now". Extended modal realism is a form of modal realism that involves ontological commitments not just to possible worlds but also to impossible worlds. Objects are conceived as being spread out in the modal dimension, i.e., as having not just spatial and temporal parts but also modal parts. This contrasts with Lewis' modal realism, according to which each object only inhabits one possible world. Common arguments for modal realism refer to their theoretical usefulness for modal reasoning...
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