
Hard problem of consciousness
Philosophical problem about why neural processes give rise to inner experience at all

Philosophical problem about why neural processes give rise to inner experience at all
In philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness (or simply the hard problem) is to explain how and why organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experience. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give rise to the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioural functions such as watching, listening, speaking (including generating an utterance that appears to refer to personal behaviour or belief), and so forth. The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioural—since each physical system can be explained purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon. Proponents of the hard problem hold that it is categorically different from the easy problems since no mechanistic or behavioural explanation could explain the character of an experience, not even in principle. Even after all the relevant functional...
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